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The Implementation of Administrative Burden Reduction Policy: Mechanisms and 
Contexts in the Study of Europeanization 
 
ABSTRACT  
The article analyzes how Administrative Burden Reduction has been implemented in 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Using an institutional processualist approach we show 
how this policy instrument has been implemented differently in these countries depending on 
the concatenation of mechanisms activated by the interplay between agency and structure. 
The article thus contributes both to the Europeanization literature and to the institutional 
processualist approach, which has so far only been applied to single country cases. 
 
 
Introduction 
The literature on Europeanization, namely on the potential impact of European integration on 
domestic „policies, politicsand polities‟ (Börzel and Risse 2003, 58) has in recent years made 
significant progress, in particular with regard to defining the domestic conditions that mediate 
the impact of the European Union (EU) and the mechanisms through which this impact 
occurs (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Graziano and Vink 2007). 
However, a number of questions remain open, with regard to implementation, the actual 
operation of the Europeanization mechanisms, and the relationship between different 
(international and transnational) sources of domestic change. Moreover, new issues are raised 
by the shift at the EU level from binding to non-binding (“new modes of governance,” NMG) 
policy instruments. In this article we tackle all these issues with reference to the adoption of 
Administrative Burden Reduction (ABR), a key element of the European Commission‟s 
better regulation agenda, in Germany, France, Italy and Spain. 
A first issue is policy implementation and outputs. The literature has privileged the question 
of the correct and timely transposition of European legislation, to the detriment of actual 
implementation, let alone policy outputs (with a few exceptions, e.g. Falkner and Treib2008). 
The question is important for all EU‟ policy modes, as it impinges on the very foundation of 
the EU‟s legitimacy as the provider of solution to policy problems that cannot be solved by 
individual countries (Zahariadis 2008). It is especially topical with regard to the more recent 
governance wave in EU policy-making, with its emphasis on networks and non-binding 
policy tools (“soft law”), as the question arises whether these more flexible, non-binding 
instruments actually do change the behavior of national actors (Cini and Rhodes 2007). This 
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article contributes to the small literature on the domestic impact of NMG (e.g. Jacquot 2010; 
Tholoniat 2010) by asking how ABR has been implemented under different national 
conditions and what the implications of these conditions, including political ones, have been 
on the effectiveness of ABR.  
Specifically, we address the implementation question by analyzing the interaction of 
mechanisms and national contexts (Falleti and Lynch 2009). While the literature has 
emphasized a number of mechanisms through which the EU can affect the domestic level, it 
still lacks a systematic treatment with regard to the scope conditions for their operation 
(Radaelli 2012). Our key research question is then how similar mechanisms or concatenations 
of mechanisms can produce different results when they unfold in different institutional 
contexts. We address this question with regard to ABR, a meta- or procedure-based 
instrument (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010) which has been taken up across the Member States. 
The mechanisms involved in the adoption of ABR have already been analyzed (Coletti 2013), 
and we move the debate forward by elucidating how they interact with national contexts and 
what this interaction implies for actual implementation and for policy outputs. 
We follow an institutional processualist approach (Barzelay 2001; Pettigrew 1997). This 
approach is sensitive to the interaction between actors‟ choices and the changing contexts in 
which actors operate. However, this approach has so far only been used longitudinally rather 
than to also compare different national contexts. Beside contributing to the Europeanization 
literature we therefore also contribute to institutional processualism by adopting it for 
comparing a single policy across different national contexts.  
Institutional processualism is also useful to tackle a further question raised by the 
Europeanization literature, namely that of multiple sources of influence on domestic actors. 
This question is especially relevant with regard to soft law, in that non-binding policy 
instruments often come down from the EU to the domestic level after having being pioneered 
by individual countries within or outside of the EU. It then becomes necessary to trace the 
horizontal impact of diffusion or transfer across countries alongside the uploading (from 
specific Member States to the EU) and downloading (from the EU to all the Member States). 
By offering a methodology to address changes in the various contemporaneous contexts in 
which domestic policy implementation occurs, institutional processualism provides a 
framework to include both European and horizontal influences. In section 1 we introduce our 
institutional processualistframework. In section 2 we motivate the case selection, describe the 
explananda and introduce the sources used.Section 3 presents the empirical evidence. Section 
4 discusses the findings and concludes. 
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Theoretical Background 
Since the 1990s the new institutionalism research agenda has been one of the most influential 
paradigm in comparative politics and public policy analysis (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
However, most of new institutionalist research tends to fall into institutional determinism. 
This pitfall is avoided by the historical variant of institutionalism whose theoretical 
foundationsoffer the potential to overturn the structuralist orientation of new 
institutionalistresearch (Hay and Wincott 1998).  
Against this background, the recent institutional processualism research program has 
contributed to historical institutionalism by taking into account that change is spurred by the 
relationship between actors and theircontext (Barzelay and Gallego 2006). As with historical 
institutionalism,institutional processualism is especially attentive to institutional 
environments and the unfolding of sequences over time. Within this context, however, 
institutional processualism, drawing on processual analysis (Pettigrew 1997), assumes that 
actors and structures are mutually constitutive and thus aims to account for the evolving 
relationship between actors‟ strategies and institutional environments. It therefore calls for an 
approach which is sensitive to how actors appropriate a structured institutional context which 
can shape and constrain their choices but is itself also the outcome of strategic action.  
Institutional processualism is inspired by comparative analysis in historical sociology 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003), as it seeks to explain 
specific outcomes by attributing them to the temporal intersection of multiple factors rather 
than seeking to identify the separate effects of individual factors.This form of explanation 
requires employing a narrative structure, which orders case evidence by focusing on the 
trajectory of events directly and intimately related to the outcome of interest as they are 
influenced by other events taking place in the surrounding context. 
In its theoretically more ambitious version it aims at middle-range generalizations by using 
mechanisms as the key conceptual resource for causal generalization of recurrent processes 
(Gerring 2008). However, there is little consensusin the social sciences about what causal 
mechanisms are. As it is now employed in institutional processualism analysis (Barzelay 
2007), the concept of mechanism draws on the research tradition interpreting it as an 
explanatory link between actors‟ behavior and social outcomes (Hedstrom and Swedberg 
1998).  
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This definition implies that mechanisms, as “portable concepts distinct from the variables 
attached to particular cases” (Falleti and Lynch 2009, 1147), interact with the different 
contexts in which they operate. Thus, given an initial set of conditions, the same mechanism 
operating in different contexts may lead to different outcomes. First, institutional structures 
affect the outcomes as they can support or hinder the activation of a mechanism. Second, the 
temporal context is also relevant for explaining outcomes since social processes are 
concatenation of mechanisms (Gambetta 1998) as “sometimes, these mechanisms counteract 
one another, and sometimes they work together” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998, 21). 
The expanding institutional processualist literature has so far omitted to investigate social 
processes concerning the implementation process of the same policy in different contexts. We 
address this gap of research by analyzing how the distinctive subset of mechanisms, so-called 
“agency mechanisms” utilized by the institutional processualist research (Barzelay and 
Gallego 2006) have operated in four different cases (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Inventory of Agency Mechanisms 
Actor certification: the validation of actors, their performance and their claims by external 
authorities (McAdam et al. 2001; Barzelay and Shvets 2006) 
Attribution of opportunity/threat: the mobilization of previously inert actor in response to 
reform efforts when they perceive the opportunity to bring about change or the need to 
protect their interests (McAdam et al. 2001; Barzelay and Shvets 2006) 
Performance feedback: the production, handling, and interpretation of information about 
effort outcomes in the light of previously established goals (McAdam et al. 2001; Barzelay 
2007) 
Focusing event: linkages between highly newsworthy occurrences and the agenda-setting 
process (Kingdon 1984) 
Spillover: Developments in neighboring policy domains that influence reform efforts 
(Kingdon 1984; Gallego 2003) 
In the institutional processualist approach agency mechanisms are activated by a mix of 
“process design features” and “process context factors” (Barzelay 2007). Process design 
features refer to the elements of the reform which are shaped by actors‟ choice such as 
guiding ideas and governance arrangements for the implementation of the policy under 
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examination. Process context factor include the political, institutional and policy factors that 
present opportunities and constraints for making use of design features. 
 
Research Design 
In choosing the policy to be investigated in comparative perspective, we focus on the 
Administrative Burden Reduction (ABR) policy which has marked a return to deregulation in 
the Better Regulation agenda (Radaelli 2007). It has been adopted by all EU Member States 
in a few yearsthanks to the development of the Standard Cost Model (SCM) methodology for 
reducing regulatory costs, leading some observers to speak in this regard of a veritable 
“policy boom” (Wegrich 2009).  
In the 1990s the Netherlands pioneered the SCM as a system for measuring and reducing the 
administrative burdens imposed on firms to fulfill the information requirements set by public 
bodies (Torriti 2007). A „baseline measurement‟ of all information obligations at some point 
in time allows for the setting of quantitative targets to reduce administrative burdens and 
track progress over a predefined period of time.The Dutch government, which held the EU 
presidency in 2004, used this opportunity to advocate the use of the SCM at the EU level, 
although at this time the SCM did not catch on in the European Commission. From the mid-
2000s the Netherlands and the early adopters (United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden) 
developed international policy networks facilitating horizontal exchange of good practice 
among senior officials interested in the approach. In the context of these exchanges, these 
forerunners involved the European Commission, which launched in 2007 an Action Program 
for the reduction of administrative burdens at both the European and national level (see also 
next section).  
The SCM has been deemed a simplistic tool as it includes neither the whole of administrative 
costs nor the social and economic benefits associated with regulation (Helm 2006).However, 
the pragmatic experience-based learning model embedded in this tool has facilitated its wide 
diffusion across European countries (Coletti and Radaelli 2013). For countries with low 
administrative capacity and often frustrated with the skills requirement imposed by a 
regulatory policy instrument such as the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), the SCM 
provided a way to implement the better regulation agenda since the flexibility of its learning 
model enabled actors to shape its design in accordance with their perception of the structured 
context.  
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However, given its focus on the measurement of information obligations, SCM is only an 
initial step towards more comprehensive ABR policies which seek to assess either overall 
compliance costs or regulatory costs from the perspective of regulatees (Lodge and Wegrich 
2009). Thus, the nature and comprehensiveness of implementation of the ABR policy 
triggered by the diffusion of the SCM has varied across the Member States. 
We address the need of more-fine grained research on SCM implementation across countries 
pointed out by Coletti and Radaelli by applying the institutional processualist framework. As 
already highlighted by Coletti (2013), the flexibility of the SCM design makes the ABR 
policy particularly suitable for the institutional processual analysis. However, we go further 
than Coletti since our research takes into account another key feature of the ABR policy, 
namely the support offered to its diffusion by an international network of adopters and by the 
European Union‟s dedicated structures.  
We base our research design on the bottom-up approach proposed by Radaelli and 
Pasquier(2007)whichstarts from the domestic level and follows the choices of domestic 
actors in order to assess the relative impact of domestic and European-level factors. This 
approach is especially sensitive to historical trajectories as it revolves around the empirical 
observation of temporal sequences to assess if and how any of the main components of the 
domestic system of interaction has encountered Europe as a contextual factor.  
We analyze temporal causal sequence at the domestic level in accordance with the narrative 
structure proposed by Barzelay (2003). This implies understanding the role of the European 
program for burdenreduction as a key process context factor for the implementation of the 
ABR policy at the domestic level. Specifically, in our research the European program is one 
of the related policy developments affecting the implementation of the ABR policy which 
also include the participation in international horizontal network for SCM diffusion, the 
implementation of previous administration simplification policies and the broader public 
management reform agenda. Process context factors also include the factors of the political 
stream (e.g. government alternation) and institutional factors (such as the coordination 
capacities of the executive and the distribution of power across levels of government). 
Context factors present constraints and opportunities to shape process design features, namely 
to implement a more or less differentiated policy from the standard Dutch SCM template. 
The interplay of design features and context factors accounts for the outputs of the policy, i.e. 
the concrete reduction of administrative costs. 
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As for process design features, we identify eight features affecting the ABR policy 
implementation and which map onto the eight core aspects of the original Dutch SMC 
template. Theseinclude: 
1) Scope of the measurement, ranging from a full baseline measurement of regulations in 
place focused on all areas of regulation to no baseline measurement with the measurement of 
selected areas as the halfway point;  
2) Ex ante measurement, ensuring that new legislation do not impose excessive burdens 
and ranging from all or none areas of regulation along the line of the baseline measurement; 
3) Scope of the reduction target, encompassing all or none areas of regulation along the 
lines of the baseline measurement;  
4) Type of regulatory costs addressed, ranging from only information obligations to 
more substantive compliance costs (OECD 2014); 
5) Type of addressees, which can include businesses, citizens, and public authorities; 
6) Oversight mechanism, required to manage the implementation of the policy across 
departments and embodied in an external watchdog or a dedicated ministerial unit; 
7) Consultation practices, which can be centralized on entrenched stakeholders or 
decentralized via perception surveys and crowdsourcing exercises (Lodge and Wegrich 2014; 
OEC 2010); 
8)  Guiding ideas concerning the administrative burden reduction policy, which can be 
framed as a technocratic exercise ensuring rigorous quantitative measurement and reduction 
of costs or as a populist campaign against the most irritating regulations aimed at making the 
simplification effort noticeable by regulatees.  
 
In choosing the cases, we excluded the frontrunners of the SCM (Netherlands, UK, Denmark, 
Sweden), as they developed their domestic policy well before the launch of the European 
policy. We included countries that have been affected by both the horizontal policy diffusion 
process and the EU program (Germany, France and Italy) and by the EU program only 
(Spain). Our case selection also provides significant variation along the two fundamental 
dimensions of domestic policy coordination: the extent of policy coordination exercised by 
the executive and the unitary-federal organisation of the state. Horizontal coordination across 
ministries is especially important for the implementation of better regulation policies . In 
terms of coordination powers core executives arestrong in France, weaker in Germany and 
weakestin Italy and Spain ((Dahlstrom et al. 2011; Sotiropoulos 2004). As for the territorial 
organisation of the state, coordination should become more difficult as the powers of 
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subnational governments increase. In terms of territorial distribution of power Germany, Italy 
and Spain can be contrasted with unitary France. Further nuance along this dimension is 
given by the fact that, among the first three country cases, according to the regional authority 
index ofHooghe et al. (2010), power is more fully distributed to the subnational level in 
Germany than in Spain and Italy, and more in Spain than in Italy. 
The empirical analysis in the next sections is based on secondary literature, analysis of 
official documents and a expert survey of 10 high-ranking officials and regulatory advisers 
knowledgeable about the ABRimplementation in the EU and the four countries under study 
(2 experts per country). Respondents are qualified experts as they all are placed in the units 
that have responsibility of planning and monitoring the administrative burden reduction 
policy. The survey was carried out in the period March-September 2012 using a semi-
structured questionnaire available from the authors. The questionnaire included three themes 
(timing and context of ABR implementation, leadership and governance of administrative 
burden reduction, outcomes), and it provided a working definition of each of its elements to 
clarify what the experts were to look for in the response and the evidence they needed to 
present. Where further information was required, the questionnaires were supplemented with 
telephone interviews. A follow-up survey was carried out in the period June-July 2014 to 
collect up to date information on the recent developments of the administrative burden 
reduction policy. 
 
Empirical analysis 
 
European Action Program as a key context factor 
After the adoption of a specific EU SCM methodology close to the Dutch prototype in 2006, 
in March 2007 the European Commission (2007) launched the Action Program for Reducing 
Administrative Burdens aiming to reduce administrative burdens arising from EU legislation 
by 25% in 13 priority areas by 2012 and invitingMember States to set own reduction targets 
by October 2008 and to implement them by 2012. 
The European Action Program was not supported by economic conditionality or legal 
coercion, but it encouraged multilevel and transnational exchanges of experiences 
establishing Single Points of Contact in Member States (SPOC), i.e. a group of national 
correspondents constituted at European level and appointed by the High Level Group of 
National Regulatory Experts which has the mandate of advising the Commission on the better 
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regulation strategy. In addition, on 31 August 2007, the Commission set up the High level 
Group of Independent Stakeholders on Administrative Burdens (HLG), composed of 15 
experts representing consultants or European enterprises and providing advice on the 
implementation of the Action Program. 
The EU has succeeded in promoting the burden reduction policy: while at the end of 2006 
only 7 Member States had launched an SCM program, by 2011 all Member States 
hadcoherent and comparable means to measure and reduce administrative burdens. As forthe 
burden reduction at the EU level, according to the European Commission, the target 
amounted to 30.8 euro billions in annual savings for businesses, representing a 25% net 
reduction in existing administrative burdens stemming from EU legislation (European 
Commission 2012).  
The burden reduction policy reached a turning point in 2010 when, under the Smart 
Regulation label, the European Commission (2010) proposed a more cyclical vision of the 
regulation process and a major emphasis on multilevel partnership. This vision led in 2013 to 
the launch of the Regulatory Fitness and Performance Program - REFIT, based on previous 
experiments (fitness-checks) on a few regulation cases (European Commission 2013).  
The prosecution of the burden reduction policy as a part of the REFIT (Administrative 
Burden Reduction – ABRPlus) addresses more explicitly the role of Member States, asking 
them to report on the implementation of about twelve specific items and on the extent to 
which they have actually reduced costs for businesses. The program addresses not only 
information obligations but also overall regulatory compliance costs resulting from inefficient 
and ineffective measures. However, the European Commission has not set a new reduction 
target. 
 
France: a shift towards the populist approach 
In 2003 experts and officials involved in the management of simplification policy since the 
early 1990s were gathered around a task force (Delegation for users and administrative 
simplification - DUSA), actively involved in the international networks dedicated to the 
horizontal diffusion of SCM among countries, who launched the measurement and reduction 
of administrative burdens project (in French MRCA) in 2004. This projectperformed a test 
run on 50 procedures. Further batches addressed a total of 150 additional procedures by the 
end of 2005. In 2006 the DUSA was incorporated into the directorate general for state 
modernization (DGME) in the Ministry of Finance. With the move to the DGME, resources 
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were expanded and the MRCA program was consolidated as the political leadership certified 
the ABR policy by adopting a target of reducing administrative burdens on business by 20% 
by the end of 2011. A major operation was launched in July 2006, when an external 
contractor identified some 10,000 information obligations out of all statutes and measured the 
full baseline. Based on this measurement, a program to reduce the 1.000 heaviest 
administrative procedures was carried out.  
In this first phase the French program was thus clearly in tune with the prescriptions coming 
from the European level and the final reduction target was raised to 25% in December 2007, 
in accordance with the launch of the EU Action Program. However, since 2008 a clear shift 
in the French methodology has loosened the connection between national policy and the 
European goal of meeting a quantitative target of burden reduction by the end of 2012.With 
the election of the President Nicolas Sarkozyin 2007the MRCA program became a part of the 
wider General Review of Public Policies (RGPP), a public management reform program 
coordinated by the Council on Public Policy Modernization, a body chaired by the President 
himself.While the new political leadership continued to support the policy (certification), it 
changed its direction, as the broader administrative modernization program interfered with 
the MRCA, which was no longer clearly aimed at business competitiveness (spillover).  
Two key process design features of the previous experimentation, cost estimation and 
quantitative reduction target, were abandoned, placing the emphasis on the practical 
implementation of more selective reduction measures, so as to achieve better potential for 
reduction on the basis of “life events” analysis. The new qualitative approach relied on 
professionally conducted opinion surveys and standing stakeholder panels complemented by 
open consultation via the Internet with a dedicated website (Ensemble simplifions) to identify 
the most irritating administrative formalities for four categories of users (businesses, citizens, 
local authorities, associations) as well as their expectations regarding burden reduction. This 
is a clear manifestation of the political leadership‟s guiding ideas on ABR as a policy 
essentially aimed at meeting the favor of the regulatees, rather than at reducing the heaviest 
bureaucratic obligations according to objective measures (Warsmann 2009).  
On this basis, a first batch of 15 reduction measures was announced in the simplification plan 
of October 2009. In June 2010 the Council on Public Policy Modernization launched a major 
simplification program of the 100 most irritating administrative procedures (integrated with 
20 further procedures in September 2011) to be realized by the end of 2012. For businesses 
only, opinion surveys conducted after a span of time measured the perceived effectiveness of 
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the simplification initiatives about each life event. Between 2011 and 2013, there have been 
perceivable improvements in some areas like public funding, starting new companies, and 
modification of a company statute, while a deterioration has been observed in construction or 
import-export procedures (Government of France 2013). 
The new populist approach has benefited from a process context factor such as the central 
government‟s high capacity for coordination which supported the interdepartmental steering 
entrusted to the DGME. Coherently with the populist approach, detailed and regular 
information has been provided on the progress of the program in real-time updates on the 
website Ensemble Simplifions. Finally, follow-up reports have been periodically issued by the 
Council on Public Policy Modernization which revealed that at the end of 2011 the ABR 
policy had already delivered tangible results in 50 administrative procedures (Government of 
France 2011). 
With the new Hollandepresidency, the feedback mechanism triggered by the positive 
perceptions of the regulatees about the effect of the populist approach, provided further 
impulse for the refinement of the ABR policy along the lines of the Mandon Report 
(Government of France 2013). In other words, the positive feedback was strong enough to 
protect the policy from the potential effects of government alternation. The revision of the 
RGPP policy has led to the adoption of a Triennial Simplification Program providing the 
institution of 59 chantiers de simplification, to the constitution of a new oversight body 
named Conseil de la simplification pour les enterprises, to the realization of an open on line 
consultation platform (faire-simple.gouv.fr), and to set up a new organizational pivot in the 
Prime minister office named Mission Simplification. The new policy involves businesses in 
collecting simplification needs, elaborating appropriate solutions, and diffusing news about 
burdens reduction initiatives. Finally, at the end of 2015 a new oversight body, exclusively 
composed of businesses representatives, will be constituted that should assess the ex-ante 
costs of new legislation. 
 
Germany: a progressive consolidation of the technocratic approach 
The long-standing and politically high-profile efforts to reduce administrative burdens since 
the early 1980s constituted a key context factor leading to the launch of the ABR policy. 
Since the previous simplification initiatives had been hampered by the lack of systematic 
evidence on the size of the actual burdens, a number of bilateral meetings with Dutch 
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officials were held to share experience with the SCM.The use of this tool was further backed 
by the European level acting as an influent context factor which certified it as a solution for 
the long standing problem of burden reduction. In April 2006 the Federal government 
launched a major program for “Bureaucracy reduction and better regulation”, certifying the 
SCM as the obligatory method to measure administrative costs resulting from the information 
requirements of federal legislation.  
This led in September 2006 to the introduction of an independent external watchdog (NKR-
Normenkontrollrat – Regulatory Control Council). In addition to the ex-ante advice and 
monitoring of administrative burdens arising from new regulations, the Regulatory Control 
Council has also provided methodological support for the measurement of existing burdens 
and the identification of reduction potential (NKR 2013). The starting point for the 
measurement of burdens was the mapping by sectoral departments of the information 
obligations for businesses under the federal laws and the transmission of the results to the 
Federal Statistics, which quantified the information costs in cooperation with associations, 
enterprises and consultancy firms. The Federal Statistics Office also developed the 
WebSKM, an online database which has been the basis for reporting by the Federal 
Government.  
The leading role played by advisory bodies such as the National Regulatory Council and the 
Federal Statistics Office reveals a technocratic approach to the identification of 
administrative burdens framed by the guiding idea that it has to provide decision-makers and 
entrenched stakeholders with maximum and rigorous transparency of costs rather than 
communicating the simplification efforts to regulatees. 
In February 2007 the Federal Government set the reduction target to 25 percent of 
administrative costs by 2011. The 25% target was to be regarded as a “net target” to avoid 
burden creep from new regulation. Given the euro 47.6 billion in annual bureaucracy costs 
for the business sector stemming from around 9,200 information obligations, a reduction of 
some 12 billion was required (Government of Germany 2012). Even though the Federal 
Government has not relied on department-specific targets in support of the overall target, two 
arrangements were introduced to counteract the negative effect of the center of government‟s 
modest capacity for coordination which had hindered the implementation of previous 
simplification initiatives. First, the reduction of administrative burdens was brought closer to 
the center of government with the creation of a Better Regulation Unit in the federal 
Chancellery in charge of coordinating the program at working level. Second, the Better 
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Regulation Unit, as an effect of the certification mechanism, has been politically supported 
by a Steering Committee composed by the line ministries‟ permanent secretaries responsible 
for administrative burden reduction and chaired by the Minister of State from the 
Chancellery. 
As a result, the ABR program met the 25% target. This result activated the positive feedback 
mechanism which encouraged the Federal government to substantially expand the program 
since January 2010 so as to address the entire measurable compliance costs of federal law 
which have been covered by the WebSKM database since 2012 (Government of Germany 
2014). In order to keep the database updated, two years after a regulation enters into force the 
Federal Statistical Office reviews the data in the light of subsequent practice.  
A main driver for the punctual implementation of the program was the interest of national 
elites in persuading the European Commission to implement the reduction of EU laws that 
caused a large share of domestic administrative costs. Furthermore, the Federal government 
decided to tackle compliance costs incurred by businesses but also by citizens and public 
authorities. Given the contextual factor of the decentralized nature of the political system,the 
quest for burden reduction has also to deal with multiple tiers of governmentestimating the 
costs imposed by new European regulations and activating individual projects of cooperation 
with Länder and local authorities to identify and reduce compliance costs. 
Special attention has been focused on the trends of costs with the view to keep them at the 
same level as 2012. The slight increase of the compliance costs in the period 2012-2013 
reveals that the objective has been achieved. However, as recommended by the NKR (2013), 
there is room for reduction to be pursued by setting new targets.  
 
Italy: a mix of technocracy and populism in a fragmented context 
The introduction of the ABR policy has been influenced by the previous development of the 
administrative simplification policy which began in 1993, when Sabino Cassese and Franco 
Bassanini, both Ministers of Public Administration, launched an ambitious rolling program of 
administrative simplification (OECD (2001). The long standing simplification policy 
constituted a key context factor along with the exposure to horizontal networks for the SCM 
diffusion, which in 2005 paved the way to the experimental application of the Dutch SCM 
template to tackle administrative burdens, which were estimated to cost around 4.6 percent of 
GDP, namely about 70 billion euros (European Commission 2006).  
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However, a comprehensive program of burden measurement and reduction was only 
launched in 2007, when the certification mechanism was activated as the Italian government 
committed to meeting the national target of 25% burden reduction proposed by the EU 
Action Program. The Italian program was launched in a unfavorable context marked by the 
executive‟s low capacity for interdepartmental steering, highlighted by the dispersion of 
coordination competences across five different units in the Cabinet Office (the Simplification 
and Quality of Regulation Unit, the Department of Public Administration, the Unit of 
Normative Simplification, the Department of Legislative Affairs and the Department of 
Regional and Local Affairs). 
The lack of effective formal channels for executive coordination was exacerbated by the 
traditional fragmentation of coalition governments. However, some process design features 
ofthe Italian policy proved to be effective in counteracting the fragmentation of the 
institutional setup(Government of Italy 2013). First, the production of cost estimates was 
entrusted to the National Institute of Statistics. Second, therehas been the intense involvement 
in all the activities (selection of the intervention areas, evaluation of costs, monitoring of 
reduction) of the business community gathered around the network of experts who sustained 
the credibility of the ABR as a policy for economic growth. Since 2012 the stakeholders‟ 
direct involvement, likewise France, was complemented by a tool for online consultation 
(Burocraziadiamoci un taglio!) allowing businesses and citizens to report cases of red tape 
and propose solutions to lessen it as well as sustaining the communication campaign which 
ensured the visibility of the results (Government of Italy 2014). Finally, Italian policy makers 
adopted aselective approach to measurement focusing on the most critical areas rather than 
mapping all information obligations, and subsequent waves of governmental decrees defined 
the key priority areas to be addressed (Salvi 2011). 
The selective approach enabled the extensive adoption of two fast-track packages issued by 
law-decrees to overcome institutional fragmentation.These remarkable results activated the 
positive feedback mechanisms sustaining the further steps towards reducing burdens enacted 
by the Monti and Letta governments, which continued the selective approach with the 
adoption of further fast-track packages.The implementation of the adopted measures was 
estimated to reduce information obligations by 9 euro billions in annual savings for 
businesses (a 29% reduction).  
In 2014, the positive feedback of the ABR policy sustained the refinement of the program by 
the new Renzi government which addressed not only information obligations but also 
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substantive compliance costs as well as enlarging the range of addressees (businesses, 
citizens and public administrations). Further, public online consultation has been 
strengthened and a number of particularly burdensome administrative procedures havebeen 
identified via a perception survey (Government of Italy 2014). Finally, attention has been 
dedicated to the ex ante measurement, introducing law n. 180/2011 (not implemented yet) 
mandating that a specific section of the impact analysis should highlight the administrative 
burdens created by new regulations. 
The ABR policy has overcome all contextual constraints but the decentralized nature of the 
political system. In 2007 a formal agreement extended to the subnational governments the 
commitment made with the European level to respect the final target. In doing so, the 
government offered methodological support to regions and local authorities by financing two 
pilot projects. A further attempt to encourage multi-level coordination was the introduction in 
2011 of a methodological committee bringing together representatives from all levels of 
government. However, only 2 out of 20 regions have launched their own ABR programs. 
 
Spain: an ineffective selective approachdriven by exogenous impulses 
In May 2007 a major program for “Better Regulation and Administrative Burden Reduction” 
was launched by the Spanish government as a response to the European Commission‟s 
invitation to set a reduction target at the national level (Government of Spain 2008). The 
certification activated by the European program led to the implementation of the ABR policy 
in a country marked by an unfavorable contextual setting.  
Administrative simplification, which only started in the late 1990s, had lagged behind as the 
Spanish system provided little institutional support for steering simplification policies, 
reflecting the tradition of autonomous ministries acting as individual actors in regulatory 
management. Further, Spain has not been involved in the horizontal networks for the 
diffusion of the SCM promoted by forerunner countries before the launch of the EU program. 
Consequently, its simplification initiatives were fragmented, incomplete, and thus incapable 
of reducing administrative burdens on businesses, which were estimated to be above the 
international average (OECD 2000). 
In a country where political commitment to administrative simplification had struggled to 
take hold, the EU Action Program encouraged a greater awareness of ABR as a key priority 
of the government‟s agenda, as shown by the ambitious Action Plan on Administrative 
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Burdens issued in June 2008 which set the reduction for all levels of government at 30% of 
burdens on business by 2012 (from a baseline of May 2007, which amounts to around 14.3 
billion euro). 
The Spanish Action Plan followed the European Commission‟s approach of targeting priority 
areas rather than screening all the regulatory stock, based on those information obligations 
that generate the highest cost for businesses. However, just six out of the thirteen areas 
identified by the European Commission (Company Law, Tax Legislation, Statistics, Public 
Procurement, Environment, and Working Environment-Employment Relations) were 
addressed by the Spanish Action Plan. Coupled with the application of a simplified version of 
the EU SCM methodology, the structured arrangements for consultation with key stakeholder 
representative of the business community backed up by formal agreements have been a key 
process design feature of the Spanish policy. 
The commitment to implement the ABR policy also implied the introduction of some 
innovative institutional arrangements as process design features aimed at counteracting the 
institutional fragmentation. First, the government created a High-Level Group (Grupo de Alto 
Nivel, GAN) tasked with preparing an Action Plan on Administrative Burdens which was 
meant to ensure leadership from the center as it was chaired by the Ministry of the Presidency 
which is responsible for the coordination of the overall policy activity of the Spanish 
executive. Second, a Better Regulation unit was created in the Ministry of the Presidency as a 
support structure to assist line ministries.  
However, weak certification (only stemming from the EU level), the entrenched informal 
nature of inter-ministerial coordination, and the lack of experience with simplification 
policies and SCM, prevented theconsolidation of the GAN, and itwas disbanded after the 
release of the Action Plan. This implied the lack of formal monitoring devices, thus reducing 
the incentives of line ministries to take action, as revealed by the cost reduction implemented 
via autonomous initiatives of line ministries which amounted to just around 3.5 billion euros 
in the 2008-2013 period.  
Although the negative feedback effects resulting from the lack of inter-ministerial 
coordination prevented ABR policy expansions, the Spanish government in the 2008-2013 
period adopted seven successive fast-track packages of fast-track measures, the only type of 
reduction available in such a fragmented institutional context, for a total of 346 
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initiatives,which implied a cost reduction of around 6.3 billion euros principally directed at 
businesses (4 euro billions) and citizens.  
However, even after the adoption of fast track packages the Spanish program was not on 
track as the reduction achieved until 2013 amounted to around 65% of the national target for 
businesses by 2012. Although the specific voluntary agreements with most of autonomous 
communities and municipalities promoted by the Ministry of Presidency, since 30% of the 
overall burden was estimated to be due to sub-national regulation, the small reduction 
achieved by local authorities (around 1.4 euro billions) reveals the reluctance of sub-national 
authorities to contribute to the national program.  
The negative feedback of the ABR policy implementation and the urgency instilled by the 
economic crisisledthe Spanish government to cut red tape via broader programs for 
digitalization implemented since October 2012 by the sub-commission for administrative 
simplification within the newly instituted Commission for the Reform of Public 
Administration-CORA (Government of Spain 2014). The shift to broader programs of 
administrative simplification effectively meant the wholesale abandonment of any 
measurement effort, whether quantitative or qualitative. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Two open issues in the European literature are the extent to which EU policies are 
implemented domestically and how the interaction of causal mechanisms and 
nationalcontexts shapes implementation. This article has addressed them with regard to the 
ABR, one of the EU‟s “new” policy instruments. 
As for the implementation of EU policies at the domestic level, this issue is particularly 
relevant for the study of “Better Regulation” as a domain characterized by the plurality of 
views regarding the inherent purposes of policy tools (Lodge and Wegrich 2009). This holds 
true for the ABR policy as shown by the different design features introduced in the four 
countries under study (Table 1).Having traced the patterns of ABR implementation by 
identifying eight core aspects of the policy in our research design, we have extended the 
analysis of previous works focusing on the SCM diffusion (Coletti and Radaelli 2013; 
Wegrich 2009) by showing that the SCM is only one of the approaches to burden reduction as 
highlighted by the shift to selective and qualitative approaches in France, Italy and Spain.  
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[Table 1 here] 
It has been precisely the flexibility of the ABR policy design which contributed to the success 
of its implementation even in an unfavorable context such as Italy since policy makers could 
shape the approach to burden reduction in accordance to the contextual settings in which they 
operate. However, in a case such as Spain the design of policy features could not overcome 
the constraints imposed by those contextual factors (lack of longstanding experience with the 
broader administrative simplification policy and the SCM) impinging on the capacity of 
policy makers to manage burden measurement. 
As for the interaction between mechanisms and national contexts in implementation 
processes, we have contributed to the Europeanization literature, where the role and scope 
conditions of causal mechanisms still needs to be systematized (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 
2012), by applying an institutional processualist approach (Barzelay and Gallego 2006) 
which has here been applied for the first time to a cross-national comparison for a single 
policy.  
First, our findings reveal that not all the agency mechanisms that we have hypothesized have 
operated in practice. Specifically, we do not find cases where focusing events or attribution of 
opportunity have contributed to the causal processes, probably because ABR is a relatively 
technical area which is likely not arouse strong popular interest.  
Second, our empirical analysis shows how mechanisms can be organized in different 
concatenations (i.e., causal processes) and produce different implementation results when 
they interact with different national contexts (Falleti and Lynch 2009).More specifically, 
certification has operated in all cases, providing impetus for the implementation of the SCM 
tool. The EU has been a process context factor that has provided a reputational incentive 
activating (in the laggard Spain) or reinforcing (in the other three cases) positive 
certification.Feedback has also been found in all four cases. However, it has operated in a 
positive or negative direction depending on the presence of two context factors: whether the 
country had pre-existing experiences with simplification and whether it was part of pre-
existing international networks. In particular, these two factors explains the difference 
direction (respectively positive and negative) of the feedback mechanism in Italy and Spain, 
two countries with otherwise similar unfavorable contexts. 
Thenature of the positive feedback effects in Germany, France and Italyhas been in 
accordance with the policy orientation of political elites, which in turn has been shaped by 
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political considerations. In Germany the political goal of influencing the European 
Commission has meant that the latest initiative triggered by positive feedback effects has 
aimed to reduce all compliance costs along the lines of the quantitative technocratic 
deregulatory approach pursued by the Dutch government (Lodge and Wegrich 2009). In 
France and Italypolitical considerations have led to the shift to qualitative techniques either to 
complement existing quantitative ones (Italy) or to replace them (France). 
The case of France also supports the argument recently advanced by Sabine Saurugger (2012) 
that, contrary to standard arguments in the compliance literature, good administrative 
capacities can actually allow Member States to modify and even subvert the objectives of 
European soft law. In fact, France is the one case where spillover occurredbecause of a 
combination of government alternation and a broad reform program. Where either of two 
elements are missing (government alternation in the case of Germany, a broad reform 
program in Italy and Spain) the spillover mechanism is not activated. 
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Table 1: Processes of ABR implementation 
Case Concatenation of Mechanisms Process Context Factors Process Design Features Outputs 
France Certification 
 
Spillover 
 
Positive Feedback 
 
 
Political Stream: Alternation in 
government 
 
Institutional factors: Centre of 
government’s high capacity 
for coordination; Centralized 
nature of the political system 
 
Related policy developments: 
Long standing simplification 
policy;  Participation to SCM 
international networks; 
Launch of the EU Action 
Program; Launch of the 
General Review of Public 
Policies 
Qualitative measurement 
No target 
Wide range of addresses 
Substantive compliance costs 
Ex ante measurement introduced but no 
implemented 
Specific coordination tools 
Consultation and crowdsourcing 
Populist approach 
 
 “Tangible results” in 50 
procedures  
 
Improvements in the 
companies’ perception 
of administrative 
burdens about some 
Life Events 
  
 
Germany Certification 
 
 
Positive Feedback 
Political Stream: Innovative 
thrust and stability of 
Executive Leadership 
 
Institutional Factors: Centre of 
government’s modest capacity 
for coordination; 
Decentralized nature of the 
political system 
 
Related policy developments: 
Long-standing simplification 
policy; Participation to SCM 
international networks; 
Full baseline quantitative measurement  
Target 
Wide range of addressees 
Ex ante measurement implemented 
Substantive compliance costs 
External watchdog and specific coordination tools 
Consultation 
Technocratic approach 
25% reduction of 
information obligations 
on businesses met 
 
Compliance costs kept 
at the same level as of 
2012 
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Launch of the EU Action 
Program 
Italy Certification 
 
 
Positive feedback 
Political Stream: 
Fragmentation and alternation 
of the executive leadership 
 
Institutional factors: Centre of 
government’s low capacity for 
policy coordination; 
Decentralized nature of the 
political system 
 
Related policy developments: 
Long standing simplification 
policy; Participation to SCM 
international networks; 
Launch of the EU Action 
Program 
Selected areas quantitative measurement 
Target 
Wide range of addressees 
Ex ante measurement introduced but no 
implemented 
Substantive compliance costs 
Fragmentation of coordination tools 
Consultation and crowdsourcing 
A mix of technocratic and populist approach 
9 euro billions in annual 
savings for businesses 
(29% reduction) 
 
Episodic local level 
reductions 
Spain Certification 
 
 
Negative Feedback 
Political Stream:  Alternation 
in government 
 
Institutional Factors: Centre of 
government’s low capacity for 
coordination; 
Decentralized nature of the 
political system 
 
Related policy developments: 
Late simplification policy; 
Launch of the EU Action 
Program 
Selected areas quantitative measurement (finally 
abandoned) 
Target 
Wide range of addressees 
No ex ante measurement 
Only information obligations 
Lack of oversight 
Consultation 
Weak technocratic approach 
30% reduction of 
information obligations 
on businesses not met 
 
Lack of significant 
contribution by 
subnational levels of 
government 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
